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Abstract
We study two n-player sequential network formation games with ex-
ternalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a
Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpro-
pose. We give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for e¢ ciency in terms of
cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields e¢ ciency.
Keywords: E¢ ciency; bargaining protocol; counterproposals; net-
work formation; transfers; externalities; groups; coalitions.
1 Introduction
We study network formation. Our focus is on the role of sequential bargaining
with group counterproposals in obtaining e¢ cient and stable outcomes.
As illustration only, say production of a good has as a side e⁄ect, exter-
nalities, on agents (e.g. pollution). Anything has a "price". The producer is
so good at networking and lobbying, with money transfers, that only she has
connections with consumers, regulators, etc., and therefore options and all the
bargaining power. Whatever she proposes is accepted, and she gets a monopolist
payo⁄ net of transfers within the status quo. Let other conditions be held con-
stant. Years later, agents learn to network (e.g. using "Facebook"); so groups
(environmental, etc.), that create externalities by destroying goods, can form
and so counterpropose. The old monopolist catches up and can do the same.
We evaluate if the changes produce a new e¢ cient status quo, where net payo⁄s
and not the amount of goods, etc., are maximized. We use the idea in Nash
(1950) [9] that if outside options (net payo⁄ prospects in other groups) change,
bargaining power is modi￿ed and the e⁄ects on stable payo⁄s can be quanti￿ed.
For this purpose, we construct two games with groups that di⁄er in size
where members are players that "propose" a permanent bilateral network link.
Groups consist either of all n players or those in the new component (sets of
links that connect a set of players directly or indirectly) that forms if the link
forms. A link forms if and only if transfers match identically in a Nash demand
1like game (Nash (1950) [10]) in each period where players in a group choose
transfers simultaneously. Some transfers are interpreted as unilateral rejections.
These can ￿ ow across components only in the n-group game. Links are proposed
in an order similar to a game of bridge as in Aumann and Myerson (1988) [2];
however, our groups are not bilateral. Such order allows players to counter-
propose in groups. Payo⁄s are obtained if the game ends. Instead, these are
given by any payo⁄ allocation rule and net of transfers (payo⁄s are therefore
endogenous). Such rules are derived from any partition or value function (of the
network structure) of a network game with and without links of communication
respectively; so externalities among players in distinct components are possible.
We rule out subgameperfect equilibria (SPE) with histories where, say, every
player in a group expects the other members to choose a unilateral rejection
even if they can do better by coordinating and matching transfers. Second,
we rule out SPE outcomes that even though better are not "rational" for the
group. For the ￿rst type of coordination failure, we use group SPE, (GSPE).
This re￿nement selects group e¢ cient SPE transfer pro￿le￿ s continuation values
assuming future players do the same. For the second type, we use Nash GSPE,
a GSPE where continuation values are the Nash Bargaining Solution which
involves not just e¢ cient but rational group coordination (See Nieva (2008b)
[12] for implementation, etc).
E¢ ciency is characterized in terms of cyclical monotonicity of payo⁄ alloca-
tion rules in the component-group game. Under this condition, the total payo⁄
of the new component that results if a given link forms can be lower than the
sum of the total payo⁄s of the merged components (which result if the given link
is severed), provided the new component is not in the e¢ cient network. The
n-group game yields always e¢ ciency (in networks without communication).
Coexistence of e¢ ciency and ine¢ ciency can occur only under GSPE.
E¢ ciency results, as for transfers, link formation depends on the total con-
tinuation value of the new group in a new component relative to the sum of all
members￿outside options. The former is the total net payo⁄ in the expected
e¢ cient network for the new group. The latter is the sum of total net payo⁄s
of the groups in the merged components as no more links are expected to form.
Coexistence is eliminated as the Nash Bargaining Solution for a player is a
monotonic function of her relative outside option. Total outside options of all
players in a new component (if another link is proposed) may decrease relative
to the sum of their outside options in the merged components. So the e¢ cient
network can fail to form. Say, if its net payo⁄s in a GSPE are better than outside
options of all players in the new component but worse than outside options for
some of these players in the merged components (See example).
Our paper belongs to the literature that studies the role of simultaneous pay-
o⁄ determination and link formation (bargaining) in non cooperative network
formation games in solving the tension between stability and e¢ ciency.1
Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4] study the e⁄ects of transfers in a simultaneous
1Non bargaining games ("with zero transfers") are surveyed in Jackson, M., (2005) [6] for
the simultaneous case; a sequential case is studied in Aumman and Myerson (1988) [2]:
2game. Rich transfers account for externalities in general; however, e¢ cient and
ine¢ cient equilibria coexist.
Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7] raise
the importance of sequentiality and non group bargaining as all their SPE are
e¢ cient for a large class of value functions. The result is obtained as the e¢ cient
network is not "blocked" and so can block ine¢ cient ones. In Currarini and
Morelli (2000) [5], in principle, given that a previous proposer can ask all of the
rest of the payo⁄ of the e¢ cient network, his demand is only constrained by
the next proposer not reciprocating links of the connected e¢ cient network. As
the latter, in turn, can ask for all the remainder in the best resulting ine¢ cient
network, the earlier proposer￿ s demand is constrained by the di⁄erence. These
constrained demands (in the e¢ cient network) can always block n decreasing
outside options (as for total payo⁄ monotonicity in players￿size of components)
as these can o⁄er better prospects even though these are decreasing too. As
outside options di⁄er in Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7], payo⁄ predictions
di⁄er. In the latter case, results also hold if there are externalities and even
without monotonicity as sorts of "transfers" with contingent cost contributions
across components are possible (so as in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4], the same
results but in a sequential game) in variations of their game.
Instead, our players in groups counterpropose. As net payo⁄s in the e¢ cient
network may not satisfy more than n outside options unless we have n player
groups, results follow. Nieva (2008a) [11] uses bilateral groups to answer open
questions (e.g. conditions for coexistence) in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4] if
counterproposals are possible.
Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) [13] ￿nd that cooperative re￿nements
like Strong and Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (that involve counterpropos-
als in a sense) in an n and 3-player simultaneous game respectively can yield
ine¢ ciency. As for the next idea and for the di⁄erence in notions of stability, our
results are complementary and general as they focus in communication networks
without externalities. Note that sequentiality is not an issue.
The criticism that results are sensitive to irrelevant details of the sequential
bargaining protocol does not apply. A necessary condition for a GSPE and su¢ -
cient for a SPE is that net payo⁄s in the ￿nal network cannot be blocked. So our
approach is both cooperative and noncooperative; nothing is irrelevant. Equi-
librium transfers and net payo⁄s have to satisfy sets of inequalities associated
to some cooperative solution (explicit in our bargaining protocols) de￿ned by
"the possibilities for coalition (groups) forming, promising, and threatening....,
rather than whose turn it is to speak" (Aumann (1988) [1]).
The criticism applies neither to Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] nor to Mu-
tuswami and Winter (2002) [7] as their games resemble bargaining without
groups and counterproposals, a degenerate case in our "family" of games. It
applies "whenever players rather than coalitions propose coalitions".
In section 2, we give notation for networks, link payo⁄ allocation rules to
value or partition functions, transform the Aumann and Myerson (1988) [2]
game into our general game, and de￿ne stability, groups and transfers￿speci￿cs.
In section 3, we study e¢ ciency (proofs are in Appendix). We conclude.
32 The Games
2.1 Preliminary De￿nitions
2.1.1 Notation for Networks
The set of players in a network relationship is N = f1;:::;ng. A network g is a
set of unordered pairs of distinct players belonging to N: Each pair is represented
by a link between the two players. So g is also the set of links of g: The number
of links in g is jgj: The set of players with at least one link in network g is N (g):
The link that joins players i and j is ij. The network with the maximum
number of links is the complete network gN. In the empty network g;, there
are no links, players are isolated: The set G of all possible networks on N is
fg : g ￿ gNg: The network that results by adding link ij to network g is g +ij:
An ordered network or (vector) ￿ ! g is a list of the jgj links in g such that its
eth entry is the eth link that has formed. The subvector that contains the ￿rst
k links that have formed is ￿ ! g K; where K = f1;:::kg. It is a subvector of the
partitioned vector [￿ ! g K;￿ ! g ￿K] = ￿ ! g .
A path in a network g 2 G between players i and j is a sequence of players
i1;:::;iK with ikik+1 2 g for all k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g; where i1 = i and iK = j 2 g.
A component of a network g is is a non empty subset of the network g0 ￿ g such
that for all i;j 2 N(g0); there exists a path between players i and j in g0; and
if i 2 N(g0) and ij 2 g, then ij 2 g0: The set of components of g is C (g):
2.1.2 Payo⁄ Allocation Rules in Networks
We study communication network and network games. In the ￿rst case (skip
wlg.), links are of communication and the primitive is a cooperative game in
partition function form w with N as the player set de￿ned as follows:
The set of all coalitions is CL = fSjS ￿ N;S 6= ?g: The set of partitions of
N is PT: The set fS1;:::;Slg 2 PT if and only if
Sl
k=1 Sk = N; 8k 2 f1;::;lg;
Sk 6= ? and Sk \ Sj = ; if k 6= j and j 2 f1;::;lg:
Let ECL be the set of embedded coalitions, the set of coalitions with speci-
￿cations as to how the other players are aligned. Formally: ECL = f(S;Q)jS 2
Q 2 PTg: For any ￿nite set L, let RL denote the set of real vectors indexed on
the members of L. A game in partition function form is a vector w 2 RECL.
For any such w 2 RECL and any embedded coalition (S;Q) 2 ECL; wN
S;Q;
the (S;Q) component of wN; is interpreted as the payo⁄ (transferable utility)
which the coalition S would have to divide if they coordinate e⁄ectively among
its members if all the players were aligned into the coalitions of partition Q.
A communication network game ￿ v assumes that e⁄ective coordination can
occur if all players in a coalition can communicate directly or indirectly with
all the other members, if N (g) = N
￿
gN￿
: So a coalition￿ s value depends not
only on the partition but on the network structure. We represent this latter
dependence by ￿ vg 2 RECL for all g 2 G: A network game with communication
is denoted by a list ￿ v where each entry corresponds to a unique g 2 G:
In network games, there is a value function v de￿ned on the set of networks.
4A payo⁄ allocation rule is an assignment of payo⁄ for each player i 2 N: In
communication networks, it depends on the partition and the network structure.
In particular, for player i; one has ’￿ v
g
i . For network games, we have ￿
g
i (given
v): Without loss of generality, we refer only to ￿g and v:
We use two notions of e¢ ciency. A network g is e¢ cient relative to v if
v(g) ￿ v(￿ g) for all ￿ g 2 G. A network g is constrained e¢ cient relative to v and
￿ if there does not exist any ￿ g 2 G and a payo⁄ allocation rule ~ ￿ such that:
(a) ~ ￿
￿ g
i ￿ ~ ￿
g
i for all i with strict inequality for some i and









The last notion is adequate if transfers ￿ ow only within components.
2.2 The Aumann-Myerson Game
In Aumann-Myerson (1988) [2] (A-M), pairs of players can accept or reject
their permanent link proposed following a rule of order o as in the game bridge.
This order o depends on the sequence of links that have formed and an initial






! gN. Let ordered
network ￿ ! g be given; where jgj =





ber of links that have not formed yet is ￿ r: Let r 2 [1;:; ￿ r]: If r ￿ 1 links in
gNng have been rejected, link ij is the rth to be proposed if the current order





link forms. Iteratively, if the rth link has formed, the new current
order o(￿ ! g ;ij) : [1;::; ￿ r ￿ 1] ! gNn(g + ij) is such that if link pq 6= ij is the mth
link in the previous order o￿ ! g ; then pq = o(￿ ! g ;ij) (m ￿ r) if m > r; otherwise,
pq = o(￿ ! g ;ij) (m + ￿ r ￿ r):
Suppose there are three players. The initial order o; is 12, 23, 13. If link 12
is rejected, 23 is proposed next. If 23 is accepted, 13 is proposed ￿rst. If then
13 is rejected 12 proposes next. If 12 is rejected the game ends, and so on.
Ordered network ￿ ! g is terminal and so is its last link ijjgj if these are the last
to form at the end of the game. Then, each player receives its payo⁄according to
the Myerson values (Myerson (1977) [8]), a payo⁄ allocation rule, in network g:
As there is perfect information, this game has subgameperfect equilibria (SPE)
each associated to a unique ￿nal network.
2.3 The General Transfer Game
The only di⁄erence between our games and that in A-M is that the formation
of a link depends on a group of players, that includes the two players that have
such link, choosing transfers out of their payo⁄s in terminal networks.
2.3.1 Players￿Actions, Histories and Networks
The initial history in the game Tr is h0 = ;. Let ‘
￿
h0￿
be a set of links that















= 1; so ij
￿
h0￿
is the ￿rst link in the A-M exogenous order o;: In period
50; there are no links and so g
￿
h0￿
= g;. Only if a player belongs to the group of















, a vector of transfers:
We de￿ne iteratively history hk+1; a sequence of transfers chosen:
For k = 0;::;￿ k, where ￿ k is the maximum number of periods the game can
have, we take as given: history hk =
￿
t￿1;t0;::;t(k￿1)￿
; where t￿1 = h0; the
ordered network that has formed ￿ ! g
￿
hk￿




























link in the current






































k)j : A transfer by
player q is a unilateral rejection if at least one of its entries is negative, if it is
not that case that tq ￿
hk￿
￿ 0: Link ij
￿
hk￿
forms and transfers are binding if
and only if for all pairs of proposers q0;q00 2 P
￿
hk￿
transfers match; that is,




; and there is no unilateral rejection.































































= 1; is the ￿rst link in the new A-M current order o￿ ! g (hk+1) pro-
posed at hk+1: If tk is not a transfer match, ￿ ! g
￿
hk+1￿
= ￿ ! g
￿
hk￿





















































link in the current A-M order proposed at hk+1 as o￿ ! g (hk+1) = o￿ ! g (hk): A pro￿le







Suppose h is a terminal history with terminal network ￿ ! g (h). So h￿1 is
the history in period jh￿1j such that jh￿1j + 1 is the total number of periods
in the game if the game ends with ￿ ! g (h) after some action was played in h￿1.
By de￿nition h describes an entire sequence of actions from the start of the
game on. We denote by H
￿ k as the set of all such terminal histories that can be
identi￿ed with the set of possible outcomes when the game is played.
2.3.2 Pure Strategies and Payo⁄s
A pure strategy for player i is a contingent plan on how to play at period k of the
game for possible histories hk. Let Hk denote the set of all period k-histories,
and Ti;Hk = [hk2HkTi;hk:
A pure strategy for player i is a sequence of maps fsk
i g
￿ k
k=1 such that sk
i maps
Hk to the set of player i￿ s feasible actions Ti;Hk (i.e., sk
i (hk) 2 Ti;hk if hk 2 Hk):
6The set of pure strategies for player i in the game is denoted by Si:
A sequence of actions for a pro￿le for such strategies s 2 S is called the
path of the strategy pro￿le, where S is the set of all strategy pro￿les: In period
zero, actions are t0 = s0 ￿
h0￿
: The actions in period 1 are t2 = s2 ￿
t1￿
and so
on. Since the terminal histories represent an entire sequence of play or path
associated with a given strategy, one can represent each players￿corresponding
overall￿ s payo⁄ as a function ui : H
￿ k ! R. Abusing notation, we denote the
payo⁄ vector to pro￿le s 2 S as u(s) = u(h), where h is the path of s, as one
can assign an outcome in H
￿ k to each strategy s 2 S: In all our games, payo⁄s
outcomes are realized only at the end of period jh￿1j for all terminal histories h;
these are denoted by ￿ (h￿1;t) where (h￿1;t) = h. Hence, payo⁄s associated to
h equal the period payo⁄s in h￿1; that is, u(h) = ￿ (h￿1;t). In that case, players
receive their payo⁄ according to the payo⁄ allocation rule net of transfers.
2.3.3 Stability Concepts
Nash Equilibrium A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a strategy pro￿le
s such that no player i can do better with a di⁄erent strategy, ui(si;s￿I) ￿
ui(s0
i;s￿I) for all s0
i 2 Si; where I = fig:
Subgameperfect Equilibrium Since all players know the history hk, one
can view the game from period k on with history hk as an extensive form game
in its own and denote it by Tr
￿
hk￿
: To de￿ne payo⁄ functions in this game,
note that if the sequence of choices and actions or path leading to an outcome
of the game in periods k through k0 are tk through tk
0












are de￿ned in a way where the only histories one needs
to consider are those consistent with hk: Precisely, any strategy pro￿le s of the
whole game induces a strategy pro￿le sjhk on any Tr
￿
hk￿
: For each i, sijhk
is the restriction of si to the histories consistent with hk: One denotes the
restriction pro￿le set by Sjhk:
Let terminal histories h0 be such that h0 = (hk;tk;::;tjh
0
￿1j) and the asso-
ciated subset of H
￿ k be denoted by H
￿ k(hk): As one can assign an outcome in
H
￿ k(hk) to each restriction pro￿le sjhk where s 2 S, the overall payo⁄ vector to
the restriction sjhk, will be denoted abusing notation by u(sjhk): Thus, one can
speak of Nash equilibria of Tr
￿
hk￿
. A strategy pro￿le s in Tr is a SPE if, for
every hk, the restriction sjhk to Tr
￿
hk￿




Re￿nements Say, we have our game Tr with two players and only one period.
The Nash equilibria are identical as those in the Nash Demand game (Nash
(1950) [10]) or that in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4]; coordination failures are
possible. In general, if there are at least two individual transfers that di⁄er
(maybe one or two of them are unilateral rejections) from the other ones at
any history in our game, such transfer pro￿le can be supported as a SPE even
though the group that proposes can do better if it coordinates on a transfer
7match (if continuation values are better for all). Based on Bernheim and Ray
(1989) [3], we assume e¢ cient cooperative bargaining in order to eliminate such
equilibria in a "similar" way pairwise Nash equilibria does in the simultaneous
games in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4]:
A group SPE (GSPE) is a SPE strategy pro￿le s such that at every history




individual GSPE continuation value ui(sj
￿
hk;t0k￿
) > ui(sjhk): If the latter in-
equality is weak, then we have a strong GSPE. If in addition pairs, coordinate
on the continuation value consistent with the Nash bargaining solution, then
we have a Nash GSPE (in any solution, future pairs do the same). Existence,
uniqueness, and implementation of Nash GSPE are studied in a companion pa-
per Nieva (2008b) [12]. Note that all these re￿nements of SPE are consistent.
This means that these are used in any future history, or, intuitively, credible.
2.4 Group and Transfer Speci￿cs
Component-group Game: Let ij be the link proposed at history h. Given h,
the group of proposers P (h) coincides with the players in the new component
g0￿ if ij forms; P (h) = N (‘(h)) (in comunication networks P (h) is a coalition)
is such that ij 2 ‘(h) = [g (h) + ij]
0 = g0￿ 2 C [g (h) + ij]:
Each proposer q 2 P (h) at h chooses simultaneously an in￿nite dimensional
vector of transfers tq (h). An entry in this vector is denoted by tq (h;h+) 2 Rn
2
;
where history h+ = h or follows h after link ij forms; i.e., its subvector h
+
jhj+1 =
(h;t); where t is a transfer match; so ￿ ! g (h+)jg(h)j+1 = (￿ ! g (h);ij):
For all k 2
￿
1;::;n2￿
and for all q 2 P (h); the kth entry in tq (h;h+) is
t
q
zz0(k) (:), a transfer from z (k) 2 P (h) to z0 (k) 2 N that player q proposes if
network ￿ ! g (h+) is terminal; so, for simplicity, there are no transfers contingent
on transfers; hence, tq (h;h+) = tq (h;h0) if ￿ ! g (h+) = ￿ ! g (h0): Transfers are zero
if h+ = h; t
q
lp (h;h) = 0; and not de￿ned in histories after link ij is rejected:
Self transfers are zero; t
q
lp (:) = 0 if l = p. Whenever ￿ ! g (h+) = (￿ ! g (h);ij);
if p = 2 P (h); then t
q
lp (h;h+) = 0; transfers are only among members in P (h) if
link ij is terminal. There are no transfer across components g0 (h+) 2 C (g (h+))
and isolated players. Abusing notation, denote isolated players as a component
g0; (h+): We then require t
q
lp (h;h+) = 0 if l 2 N (g0 (h+)) and p = 2 N (g0 (h+)):
Consider terminal history h 2 H
￿ k with terminal network ￿ ! g : The subvector
hKe, e ￿ jgj; is the history in period ke where the eth link of ￿ ! g forms; h is then
consistent with hKe: Let t(hKe) be the transfer match at hKe: Period payo⁄s
are not discounted and these are zero unless g = gN and t(h￿1) is a transfer
match, or g 6= gN and t(h￿1) is not a transfer match. In any case, q 2 N gets
her payo⁄given by the allocation rule ￿g
q in terminal network g plus transfers to
her from proposers m 2 P (hKe); e ￿ jgj; minus her transfers to other players
p 2 N agreed upon when she proposes. Let ￿ = fejq 2 P (hKe)g; fhKege2￿ is
the set of all histories where q proposes. The net payo⁄ for q is












8The n-group Game: Abusing notation, it is the component game where
for all h, the n players are in the "new component" if ij (h) forms.
3 E¢ ciency Analysis
First, we illustrate why a necessary condition for a GSPE and su¢ cient for a
SPE is that a transfer match and net payo⁄s in the ￿nal network have to satisfy
sets of inequalities, or, equivalently, net payo⁄s cannot be blocked by a group in
another network.
Example: A three player network game where the order is 12;23;13







2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3
￿213
2 = 0 ￿213















Suppose that players 1 and 2 choose a transfer match that yield net payo⁄s
of half each and form link 12 in period 0. If links 23 and 13 are rejected in
that order, they indeed get this as then the game ends. Hence, the continuation
values of players in group f1;2;3g if unilaterally rejecting in period 2 (when
they propose link 13) are (:5;:5;0).
Suppose GSPE (or strong GSPE) is used. If network 213 forms with any
given transfer match, the complete network forms in any GSPE of the subgame
at next period 3 as link 23 is accepted. If a player unilaterally rejects 23, players
obtain any given associated triplet of net payo⁄s in terminal network 213; these
outside options sum up to zero. As the complete network￿ s total payo⁄ is 1:2;
the same group in the complete network can block outside options with better
net payo⁄s (cooperative notions using inequality conditions); as then, there is
no individual pro￿table deviation, there is always a Nash equilibrium and so
a SPE in period 3 that gives any player at least the continuation value of her
unilaterally rejecting (non cooperative notions). Note that total continuation
values of any such given transfer match sum up to 1:2 in previous period 2.
If any network is blocked by the complete (ordered) network (in the sense
above), terminal on the path of some strategy pro￿le, that is, if all required
inequalities2 are satis￿ed, then the complete network is a SPE outcome as then,
it is not blocked. In general, there can be e¢ cient and ine¢ cient SPE ￿nal
networks with net payo⁄s that don￿ t require satisfying such inequalities. More
networks can be ￿nal if players in groups fail to coordinate by choosing unilateral
2Net payo⁄s for a deviator on such path in the expected complete network have to be at
least as good as the one she expects in the resulting network after her deviation.
9rejections. Note that, such failure is not allowed in any cooperative solution3.
Hence, once we require GSPE, not being blocked becomes a necessary con-
dition for a network to be ￿nal. Now, even if all the required inequalities are
satis￿ed for a given network to be ￿nal (say, in a di⁄erent scenario, network 213
o⁄ering net payo⁄s that are better than (:5;:5:0) and net payo⁄s in the complete
network, etc.), in general, transfer matches may coexist that don￿ t satisfy the
inequalities4 and can not be eliminated in a GSPE; its continuation payo⁄s may
be better for one member and worse for the other one relative to the ones of
matches that do satisfy the inequalities (See Nieva (2008a) [11] for examples).
Next, with the same example, we illustrate the idea that for all equilibria
to be e¢ cient a necessary condition is that a Nash GSPE like solution is used;
moreover, such a solution is consistent with Aumann￿ s quote in the introduction.
Even if total continuation values in period 2 are better than total outside
options, 1:2 > :5+:5+0; link 13 may not form. Given any transfer match, there is
a GSPE in next period 3 in which at least one of the three players looses relative
to (:5;:5;0). Then, accepting link 13 is not even a SPE outcome in the subgame
at period 2. For any loser, it is optimal to unilaterally reject. The only way to
ensure that the three players get at least their outside options in period 2 is for
the transfer match not to change them in next period 3. But its sum has to be
equal to zero: So, in general, e¢ ciency is not an equilibrium. However, under
Nash GSPE, e¢ ciency is restored as any division of 1:2 among the three players
is a continuation value for an appropriate transfer match in period 2. Say, if
transfer match implies the triplet (:15;:15;￿:3); the Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS) adds
(1:2￿0)
3 = :4 to these outside options in period 3; so (:55;:55;:1) >
(:5;:5;0): In contrast, the GSPE can yield (:4;:4;:4) > (:15;:15;￿:3); but then
link 13 is rejected in period 2.
We think that GSPE is not reasonable in this set up as it does not respond
by increasing the continuation value of a player with a higher outside option.
Groups fail to coordinate in subtle threats. Note that implicit in Aumann￿ s
quote is the assumption that threats have to be the outcome of cooperation,
rational, and not just e¢ cient coordination of actions.
The illustration for the role of cyclical monotonicity (c.m) and the irrelevance
of contingent transfers in obtaining e¢ ciency follows. Loosely, if c.m. holds all
players in a group on a path to an e¢ cient ordered network gain by matching
transfers. As a consequence, they merge components they belong to to begin
with. So what matters for link formation are total continuation payo⁄s of groups
or, equivalently, components, as contingent transfers are "renegotiated" (See, in
contrast, the bilateral-group game in Nieva (2008a) [11]).
Let d and a be the total payo⁄ for the complete network and the two link
network respectively in the same example. Denote by c and bc the total payo⁄
for the linked players in a one link network and that of the isolated player
respectively. Let bi, bj and bl be the payo⁄ for the individual players in the
3There are restrictions on which coalitions can block. But if one can block, threats are
payo⁄s that sum up to its total payo⁄; blocking is e¢ cient.
4This means that if such matches are chosen the given network will not be ￿nal.
10empty network. The order is ij, jl; il.
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for e¢ cient Nash GSPE are:
I) (d ￿ a) + a > a, so after a two link network, the complete one forms;
II) given I, (d ￿ (c + bc)) + (c + bc) > (c + bc); so after a one link network
one with two links forms;
III) given II, 2
3 (d ￿ c ￿ bc) + c > bi + bj, so group fi;jg forms link ij (say,
i = 1; j = 2; l = 3) "if bi and bj are outside options".
Note that the ￿rst term in brackets in each inequality is the Nash Surplus,
the amount beyond the total outside options that all proposers receive if a link
forms. Also, in III, group fi;jg receives 2
3 (d ￿ c ￿ bc)+c regardless of how c is
divided according to i and j￿ s transfer match. So if the three conditions hold,
as before, there is a division of c that yields continuation payo⁄s that would be
better than "outside options bi, bj", the bilateral NBS; so the ￿rst link ij forms
expecting the complete network.
Strong c.m. holds as all ordered e¢ cient networks satisfy I-III. Even if ijl
(123) forms in period 1, the complete network forms. If link 12 is rejected, net
payo⁄s are those in the complete network that forms if either link 23 is accepted
in period 1 or rejected. Note that bi and bj are not outside options in period 0:
In general, strong c.m. is su¢ cient but not necessary. Consider a non sym-
metric payo⁄ allocation rule. Even if the e¢ cient network can still be reached
after a deviation, the resulting ine¢ cient ￿nal network may not block continu-
ation values of not deviating.
The term cyclical is used as a new component that results by merging, say,
two, may have a total payo⁄ lower than the sum of payo⁄s in these two even
if the former has more members. That is not true with size monotonicity in
Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5]. Note that example exhibits size monotonicity.
The condition has more inequalities as the total payo⁄of a given component
(and so outside options) may be in￿ uenced by externalities depending on the
order and number of merged components by the time the players in the given
component group propose again. Before formalizing, we de￿ne concepts.
Given network g, the component value function is v0g : C (g) ! R. The
total payo⁄ of a component is v0 (g0); g0 2 C (g); and it is equal to the sum of




i: Let ￿ ! g 0￿
￿X = ijjgj￿x +
P
t=1;::;p(￿ ! g ￿(X+1))
￿ ! g 0t
￿(X+1) be the new component ￿ ! g 0￿
￿X 2 C (￿ ! g ￿X) that re-
sults if the (jgj ￿ x)
th link of ￿ ! g forms and p
￿￿ ! g ￿(X+1)
￿
components ￿ ! g 0t
￿(X+1) 2
C
￿￿ ! g ￿(X+1)
￿
merge. Abusing notation, denote a player i without links as a
component ￿ ! g 0; of ￿ ! g . Set N
￿￿ ! g 0;￿
= i: The total continuation value for players
N (￿ ! g 0) in component ￿ ! g 0 is F (￿ ! g 0).
Condition: Given order o, and payo⁄ allocation rule ￿; the set of compo-
nent value functions v0g, g 2 G; is strong (weak) cyclical monotonic if for each
(at least one) e¢ cient ordered network
￿ !
￿ g :
(a) Set ￿ ! g =
￿ !
￿ g and F (￿ ! g 0) = v0g (￿ ! g 0). Iteratively for x = 1;:::;jgj￿1: For
t = 1;:;p(￿ ! g ￿X), the Nash surplus for players in merged component ￿ ! g 0t
￿X is
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￿￿ ! g 0t
￿X
￿
> 0: Set F


















￿ ! g 0
￿(X￿1)
￿
; where ￿ ! g 0
￿X 2 C (￿ ! g ￿X) is not merged.
(b) If
￿ !
￿ g can still form, it is never a Nash GSPE to form a link ij = 2 ￿ g.
(c) Condition in (a) does not hold for any ￿ ! g N
E; where e > j￿ gj and any ￿ ! g N




Part (b) is necessary if the e¢ cient network is not the complete one. Also,
(b) is a tautology; a more precise condition requires ordered network speci￿c
variations of (a+c) that are almost a restatement. If
￿ !




￿ g = ￿ ! g N. Consider a symmetric n player cooperative game without
externalities but with cooperation structures. Let v(N1 [N2 [N3) be the value
of the coalition of n players. Let the three sets be disjoint and so a partition of
N, jNj = jN1j + jN2j + jN3j: Let N1 and N2 merge ￿rst on a path to
￿ !
￿ g . Two
conditions for this (incomplete) "order of ￿ner partitions" are
v(N) ￿ v(N1 [ N2) ￿ v(N3) > 0; and




k=1;:;3jNkj [v(N) ￿ v(N1 [ N2) ￿ v(N3)] > v(N1) + v(N2):
These conditions may seem complex and most importantly not practical.
But note that superadditivity in links, superadditivity of cooperative games
and "monotonicity" as in Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] and Mutuswami and
Winter (2002) [7] imply our condition but not viceversa. So, this complexity
seems to be the cost of generality.
Theorem 1: Under strong c.m, all Nash GSPE are e¢ cient and constrained
e¢ cient.
Corollary 1: If all Nash GSPE are e¢ cient then weak c.m. holds.
In the n-group game the analysis is very similar.
Theorem 2: All Nash GSPE outcomes are e¢ cient for all network games.
4 Conclusion
We study two "cooperative and noncooperative" sequential network formation
games with counterproposals of transfers tied to link formation. It seems to be
that a necessary condition for solving the tension between stability and e¢ ciency
is that the e¢ cient network can block. With counterproposals, the all player
group is su¢ cient. The role of groups of heterogenous sizes with other factors,
maybe overlooked, are important issues. Bilateral groups are studied in Nieva
(2008a) [11]. Anyway, a Nash GSPE like solution concept is needed in general.
Its appeal is being consistent with rational threat behavior of blocking coalitions
(for its implementation, see Nieva (2008b) [12]).
125 Appendix
Proof Th. 1: Let ￿ g be e¢ cient. Suppose for now that ￿ g is ￿nal if it forms.
By contradiction, let some ordered network
￿ !
￿ g ￿1 be ￿nal. As for strong c.m.,
￿ !
￿ g forms. The total continuation value for proposers at history ￿ hKj￿ gj￿1; where
the (j￿ gj ￿ 1)
th link of
￿ !
￿ g , o￿ !














; t is a transfer match, and s￿j
￿￿ hKj￿ gj￿1;t
￿





By induction for x = 2;:::;j￿ gj ￿ 1, suppose that if
￿ !





￿ g ￿X be ￿nal. By strong c.m. (a+b), if link o￿ !
￿ g ￿X (￿ r) 2
￿ !
￿ g is the
last e¢ cient link in the current order to be proposed (at ￿ hK
j￿ gj￿(x￿1)), without




































is a Nash GSPE and td contains unilateral rejec-
tions. Then at least this e¢ cient link forms in the current order o￿ !
￿ g ￿X: In a
possible scenario, using (a+b), an e¢ cient ￿ rth < ￿ r preceding link forms if ￿ ! ￿ g
















￿ g is the ￿nal ordered
network: Hence if
￿ !
￿ g ￿X forms
￿ !
￿ g forms.
After using (c) with a "reverse" argument, if
￿ !
￿ g forms, it is ￿nal￿
Proof Th. 2: Consider any g as a component with n players. Then, (a+c)
in c.m. hold. We show (b). Suppose that no e¢ cient link is left to be proposed
in the current order: if a ￿rst ine¢ cient one forms, its Nash GSPE continuation
net payo⁄s have to improve on (1) given net payo⁄s obtained if all remaining
links are rejected; second, the same is true if another ine¢ cient link forms with
respect to (2) continuation net payo⁄s if an ine¢ cient link is expected to form
in a Nash GSPE. As (a) holds, from Th. 1, there is a transfer match such
that Nash GSPE continuation net payo⁄s are better than (2) or (1) if the last
e¢ cient link is rejected. Any ine¢ cient link proposed earlier on is rejected as at
least one player gains expecting the e¢ cient network to form (regardless of the
e¢ cient link in the order that forms later on) as there is still an e¢ cient link
to be proposed. As this holds for any given payo⁄s, if an e¢ cient link forms,
another e¢ cient one forms next￿
5These are total net payo⁄s for the group P
￿￿ hKj￿ gj￿x
￿
in the e¢ cient network if players
in components to be merged agree at ￿ hKj￿ gj￿x on a transfer match.
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